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Essay
Legislative Intentions in Antonin Scalia’s and Bryan
Garner’s Textualism
JEFFREY GOLDSWORTHY
In Reading Law, the late Justice Antonin Scalia and his co-author Bryan
Garner defend “pure textualism,” partly because they deny that legislatures can
have any intentions other than to enact statutory texts. This denial would, if
adhered to rigorously, make their version of textualism unviable. It is inconsistent
with context and purpose being used to (a) dispel ambiguities, (b) correct
scrivener’s errors, (c) reveal presumptions or background assumptions that
qualify literal textual meanings, (d) reveal most kinds of implicit and implied
content, and (e) resolve conflicts between the interpretive canons. It would, in
other words, entail hyperliteralism, which Scalia and Garner explicitly reject. This
is no doubt why, as I show, they do not rigorously adhere to that denial. To the
contrary, in accepting that context and purpose can be used to do all these things,
they frequently rely on legislatures having intentions in addition to merely
enacting statutory texts. Notwithstanding their theoretical dismissal of substantive
legislative intentions as non-existent, their actual interpretive practice confirms
the intentionalist thesis that sensible interpretation of enacted laws necessarily
presupposes the existence of such intentions, and endeavors to reveal and clarify
them.
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Legislative Intentions in Antonin Scalia’s and Bryan
Garner’s Textualism
JEFFREY GOLDSWORTHY *
I. INTRODUCTION: SCALIA’S AND GARNER’S TREATMENT OF
SUBSTANTIVE LEGISLATIVE INTENTIONS
In Reading Law, the late Justice Antonin Scalia and his co-author
Bryan Garner (collectively, “SG”) advocate “pure textualism.”1 This
requires “[a]n interpretation based purely on the words of a governing text,
in their context, as the sole legitimate guides to meaning,”2 which “begins
and ends with what the text says and fairly implies.”3 It follows that
“neither a word nor a sentence may be given a meaning that it cannot
bear,”4 “except in the rare case of an obvious scrivener’s error.”5 They
condemn any departure from textual meaning in order to give effect either
to extra-textually derived intentions or purposes, or to consequences
perceived as undesirable.6 On the other hand, they distinguish their own
“pure textualism” from “strict interpretation” or “hyperliteralism,” mainly
because those approaches ignore context, including statutory purpose, and
cannot accommodate implications.7
SG say that textual meaning is determined by “[n]othing but
conventions and contexts.”8 “Anglo-American law has always been rich in
interpretive conventions,” which include ordinary linguistic conventions
and special legal ones.9 Many of them, of both kinds, are embodied in
so-called “canons” of interpretation, which SG aim to revive after a period
of unfortunate relative neglect.10 They estimate that the canons they
endorse as “valid” represent only about a third of the possible candidates

*
Emeritus Professor of Law, Monash University; Professorial Fellow, The University of
Melbourne; Adjunct Professor, The University of Adelaide.
1
ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL
TEXTS, at xxix (2012).
2
Id. at 431.
3
Id. at 16.
4
Id. at 31, 40.
5
Id. at 57.
6
Id. at xxvii, 394–95.
7
Id. at 39–41, 356–57, 427, 431.
8
Id. at xxvii.
9
Id.
10
Id. at xxvii–xxviii, 9.
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that can be found in law reports; they have rejected the others for being
“incoherent, not genuinely followed, or in plain violation of our
constitutional structure.”12
Their textualism is motivated primarily by normative concerns, in
particular, that judicial departures from textualism greatly expand judicial
discretion, consequently undermining the rule of law and usurping
lawmaking power that is constitutionally vested in legislatures.13 But it also
seems motivated partly by their denial that legislatures can have
substantive intentions. While acknowledging that the language of
legislative intent has infused judicial discourse for “more than 600
years,”14 they boldly claim that
[in] the context of legislation . . . collective intent is pure
fiction because dozens if not hundreds of legislators have
their own subjective views on the minutiae of bills they are
voting on – or perhaps no views at all because they are
wholly unaware of the minutiae. . . . There is no single set of
intentions shared by all. The state of the assembly’s
collective psychology is a hopeless stew of intentions . . . .
Yet a majority has undeniably agreed on the final language
that passes into law. That is all they have agreed on . . . .15
“The stark reality is that the only thing that one can say for sure was agreed
to by both houses and the President (on signing the bill) is the text of the
statute. The rest is legal fiction.”16 They go so far as to assert that “it is
high time that further uses of intent in questions of [statutory]
interpretation be abandoned.”17
I will argue that their denial that legislatures can have any intentions
other than to enact particular texts would, if adhered to rigorously, make
their version of textualism unviable. It would entail hyperliteralism, which
we have seen they reject. But I will show that they do not rigorously
adhere to that denial; to the contrary, they frequently rely on legislatures
having intentions in addition to merely enacting statutory texts, including:
(a) intentions that statutory language has particular meanings, (b)
intentions that those meanings communicate particular norms, and (c)
11

Id. at 9.
Id. at 31.
13
They also argue that a textualist approach will motivate legislatures to legislate more carefully.
See id. at 100, 344–45 (illustrating what happens when courts apply unwise law as written—
legislatures cure it, statutes books become more complete, and there are fewer judge-made exceptions).
14
Id. at 395–96.
15
Id. at 392–93. They also approve of the statement that “whenever a law is adopted, all that is
really agreed upon is the words.” Id. at 397 n.4 (quoting Josef Kohler, Judicial Interpretation of
Enacted Law, in SCIENCE OF LEGAL METHOD 187, 196 (1917)).
16
SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 1, at 376.
17
Id. at 396.
12
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intentions (called purposes) that those norms should achieve particular
objectives. Despite their theoretical dismissal of most legislative intentions
as fictional, their actual interpretive practice corroborates the view of
intentionalists, such as Rick Kay, Larry Alexander, Richard Ekins, and me,
that sensible interpretation of enacted laws necessarily presupposes the
existence of such legislative intentions and endeavors to reveal and clarify
them.18 Scalia provides yet another example of a phenomenon noted by
Ekins and me:
Judges who deny the reality of legislative intentions find it
impossible to avoid regular and apparently orthodox
reference to them. When they put theory aside, and actually
read statutes, they rarely practise what they preach. They
invariably resort to some kind of intentionalism.19
II. SG’S MORE QUALIFIED STATEMENTS ABOUT LEGISLATIVE INTENTION
In contrast to SG’s strong assertion that substantive legislative
intentions are non-existent, they often write of such intentions more
sympathetically. They quote with approval other judges and authors who
assert the importance of legislative intentions. For example, they describe
as “accurate” the statement that “the real object of . . . interpretation . . . is
merely to ascertain the meaning and will of the lawmaking body,”20 and
say that:
Interpretation . . . is “the ascertainment of the thought or
meaning of the author of . . . a legal document, as expressed
therein, according to the rules of language and subject to the
rules of law.”21
They also quote approvingly Sir Edward Coke’s statements that a legal
text should be construed as a whole because the sense of one clause can be

18

Rick Kay has not discussed statutory interpretation at length, focusing instead on constitutional
interpretation. But most of his arguments about constitutions transfer smoothly to statutes. He has
confirmed to me that in his view, “every instance of enacted law should be interpreted so as to
effectuate the intentions of the enactors.” E-mail from Richard S. Kay, President, Am. Soc’y of
Comparative Law, to author (May 22, 2019) (on file with author).
19
Richard Ekins & Jeffrey Goldsworthy, The Reality and Indispensability of Legislative
Intention, 36 SYDNEY L. REV. 39, 59 (2014). See also LAWRENCE M. SOLAN, THE LANGUAGE OF
STATUTES: LAWS AND THEIR INTERPRETATION 101–03, 110 (2010) (suggesting that Justice Scalia’s
“rationale for using ordinary meaning is that it serves as a surrogate for legislative intent”).
20
SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 1, at 15 (quoting WILLIAM M. LILE ET AL., BRIEF MAKING AND
THE USE OF LAW BOOKS 337 (3d ed. 1914)).
21
Id. at 53 (quoting H.T. Tiffany, Interpretation and Construction, in 17 AMERICAN AND
ENGLISH ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW 1, 2 (David S. Garland & Lucius P. McGehee eds., 2d ed. 1900)).
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found “by the words or obvious intent of the other” which “expresseth the
meaning of the makers.”22
Their claims that legislative intentions are fictional are frequently
unclear and inconsistent. They say that “the genuine intent of the
legislators” is “nonexistent,”23 but also that the “subjective intention” of
lawmakers is “almost always . . . a legal fiction, and when not that, an
unascertainable reality.”24 At one point, they refer to “the ignis fatuus
[delusion] known as ‘drafter’s intention,’” immediately after suggesting
that such an intention might be “apparent from text and context.”25
In their Glossary, they define “legislative intent” as: “The design or
plan that the enacting legislature had for the application of a statute to
specific situations that might arise,” and comment that “[w]hen this design
or plan is not apparent from the text, it is a fictional intent that cannot be
reliably ascertained.”26 It is notable that: (a) they seem to concede that the
legislature can have such a design or plan, which differs from just an
intention to enact the text; (b) such an intent can hardly be “fictional” if it
can sometimes be apparent from the text; (c) if it can exist, it seems
doubtful that there is only one way of ascertaining it––namely, from the
text––particularly given that elsewhere they concede that context as well as
text is crucial to interpretation; (d) if it were indeed “fictional,” the word
“reliably” would be inapt, since something that does not exist cannot be
ascertained at all; and (e) this definition does not include broader intentions
such as purposes, or assert that they are also fictional. We will later see that
SG acknowledge the existence of legislative purposes.
Elsewhere, SG agree that it is “entirely correct” to say that “rules of
grammar govern unless they contradict legislative intent or purpose,”
provided that the statement “refers to legislative intent or purpose
manifested in the only manner in which a legislature can authoritatively do
so: in the text of the enactment.”27 Comments similar to (a), (b), and (c)
could be made about this statement.
There are many references in the book to what the drafters of laws
probably meant, intended or had in mind, although it is usually unclear
whether or not they use the term “drafters” to mean something different
from “lawmakers.”28 SG insist that the interpreter’s mission is to
“determine what the drafter has actually said,”29 but when that is prima
22

SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 1, at 167 (quoting Sir Edward Coke, The First Part of the
Institutes of the Laws of England, or a Commentary on Littleton § 728, at 381a (14th ed. 1791)).
23
Id. at 394.
24
Id. at 435.
25
Id. at 206.
26
Id. at 432.
27
Id. at 140.
28
Id. at 18, 29, 30, 32, 156 (referring to the drafters as enacting the text).
29
Id. at 206.
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facie uncertain, they sometimes rely explicitly on evidence of what the
drafter had “in mind.”30 For example, they quote with apparent approval a
judicial statement that “had the drafters of the statute intended” a phrase to
bear a certain meaning, they could have used different wording.31 Later, in
a different context, they approve the same reasoning, whereby a proposed
interpretation was properly rejected because, as Judge Jerome Frank
“memorably noted[,]” “there would have been straightforward ways for
legislators to arrive at” the desired result.32 As the Judge put it:
Congress knows—who would not?—how to prevent such
double taxation. A short sentence would have done the trick.
The familiar ‘easy-to-say-so-if-that-is-what-was-meant’ rule
of statutory interpretation has full force here. The silence of
Congress is strident.33
Judge Frank was explicitly inferring what Congress probably meant—
or intended—from its failure to include words that were obviously needed
and could easily have been included to achieve a different outcome.
In disagreeing with a Canadian decision that the statutory term
“ordinances” meant “laws made by a legislative body,” SG say that
“[t]here is no more reason to believe that ordinances were meant to be
similar to Acts in regard to the nature of the promulgator than there is to
believe that they were meant to be different in that regard.”34 They are
surely referring to what the drafters or lawmakers meant by using the term,
which amounts to referring to what they intended by using it.
III. SG’S INTERPRETIVE METHODOLOGY
A. The “Fair Reading” of the Text
One of SG’s central ideas is that textualists seek a “fair reading” of a
legal text, which is an “objectivizing construct.”35 It is defined as follows:
The interpretation that would be given to a text by a
reasonable reader, fully competent in the language, who
seeks to understand what the text meant at its adoption, and

30

Id. at 206.
Id. at 150 (citing Waxham v. Smith, 70 F.2d 457, 459 (9th Cir. 1934)).
32
Id. at 181.
33
Commissioner v. Beck’s Estate, 129 F.2d 243, 245 (2d Cir. 1942) (citation omitted).
34
SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 1, at 196.
35
Id. at 33–41, 393.
31
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who considers the purpose of the text but derives purpose
from the words actually used.36
Elsewhere, they suggest that a fair reading is how “an informed,
reasonable member of the community,” who is “fully competent in the
language” and “aware of all the elements (such as the canons) bearing on
the meaning of the text,” “would have understood the text at the time it
was issued.”37
This idea in itself does not render the concept of legislative intention
irrelevant, because such a reasonable reader might regard legislative
intention as “bearing on the meaning of the text”—insofar as this is
consistent with the canons. SG themselves say they would have no quarrel
with a search for legislative intent if it were confined to deriving intent
“solely from the words of the text.”38 Moreover, they acknowledge that a
legislative intention can be derived from the text of a law even in the
absence of “an express provision”;39 presumably, it can be implied by the
text. The same is true of “purpose.”40 On one reading, what they oppose is
reliance on “subjective intent” derived from sources extrinsic to the text,
which are “lawmakers’ unenacted desires.”41 Yet they also insist that
context as well as text is crucial to interpretation.
B. Context
SG insist that the textualist search for “the accepted contextual
meaning that the words had when the law was enacted.”42 They go so far as
to say that “the soundest legal view seeks to discern literal meaning in
context.”43 Their willingness to take context into account (which, of
course, common lawyers have always done) suggests that they should
perhaps call themselves “contextualists” rather than “textualists.” More
importantly, most linguists and philosophers of language regard context as
relevant to meaning mainly because it is evidence of authorial purpose and
intention. So, when SG rightly say that ambiguity and vagueness can
36
Id. at 428. See also id. at 15–16 (“[W]ords mean what they conveyed to reasonable people at
the time they were written—with the understanding that general terms may embrace later technological
innovations.”).
37
Id. at 33, 393, 428, 435 (providing the definition of “original meaning” and explanation of “fair
reading”).
38
Id. at 30.
39
Id. at 291.
40
Infra Part III.C (“Purpose”).
41
SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 1, at 29–30.
42
Id. at 16.
43
Id. at 40. See also id. at 167 (“Perhaps no interpretive fault is more common than the failure to
follow the whole-text canon, which calls on the judicial interpreter to consider the entire text, in view
of its structure and of the physical and logical relation of its many parts . . . . Context is a primary
determinant of meaning.”).
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“often be clarified by context,” they are vulnerable to the retort that this is
because context is evidence of which sense of a word the author or speaker
probably had in mind.
The book suffers from at least one serious omission. In its eagerness to
dismiss the relevance of legislative history, it almost entirely fails to
acknowledge common law courts’ long-standing willingness to take into
account other extra-textual—including historical—evidence of probable
legislative intentions and purposes, including the pre-existing state of the
common law and statute law, notorious historical facts of which judicial
notice could properly be taken, and so on. Such evidence has generally
been regarded as admissible in common law jurisdictions, including the
United States.45 I say that the book “almost entirely” fails to acknowledge
this because in advocating originalism in interpreting the Constitution, it
concedes that the meaning of constitutional provisions can legitimately be
clarified by pertinent historical facts that were well known to the founders.
For example, they argue that the interpretation of the Second Amendment
was greatly assisted by “the historical knowledge (possessed by the
framing generation) that the Stuart Kings had destroyed the people’s
militia by disarming those whom they disfavoured.”46 Whether or not this
is true, it concedes the general principle that the historical background to a
law, if probably known to the lawmakers, can clarify the law’s meaning—
and that can only be because it clarifies the lawmaker’s likely intentions.
C. Purpose
SG regard “the purpose of the text” as “a vital part of its context.”47
Since “words are given meaning by their context, and context includes the
purpose of the text,” textualist interpretation “almost always” considers

44

Id. at 33. See also id. at 70 (explaining that interpretation will not be “straightforward and
easy,” and that most common English words have multiple dictionary definitions, “some of them quite
abstruse and rarely intended” and “[o]ne should assume the contextually appropriate ordinary meaning
unless there is reason to think otherwise . . . which [also] ordinarily comes from context”).
45
See, e.g., SIR PETER BENSON MAXWELL, ON THE INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES 20–21 (1875);
PETER ST. JOHN LANGAN & SIR PETER BENSON MAXWELL, MAXWELL ON THE INTERPRETATION OF
STATUTES 47–50 (12th ed. 1969); ELMER A. DRIEDGER, CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES 149–51 (2d ed.
1983); JOHN BELL & SIR GEORGE ENGLE, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 140–42 (2d ed. 1987); G. E.
DEVENISH, INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES 127–29, 130–33 (1992); DONALD GIFFORD, STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION 117–19 (1990); Henry Campbell Black, Chapter VII: Extrinsic Aids in Statutory
Construction: Contemporary History, in HANDBOOK ON THE CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF
THE LAWS 285–89 (2d ed. 1911); 2 J. G. SUTHERLAND & FRANK E. HORACK, JR., STATUTES AND
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 482–83 (3d ed. 1943).
46
SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 1, at 400–01.
47
Id. at 33.
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purpose. Since “evident purpose always includes effectiveness,” the text
should always be interpreted so as to carry out rather than defeat its
“manifest object”50—“the textually manifest purpose of the act.”51 But that
purpose “cannot be used to contradict text or to supplement it;”52 it “sheds
light only on deciding which of various textually permissible meanings
should be adopted.”53
SG frequently insist that purpose must be derived exclusively “from
the text, not from extrinsic sources” including legislative history.54 The
only relevant purposes are “concrete manifestations as deduced from close
reading of the text.”55 “The only goals inarguably sought . . . are those
embodied in the enacted text.”56 They seem keen to avoid referring to
legislatures having purposes and go so far as to refer to “[t]he evident
purpose of what a text seeks to achieve.”57 But it is surely obvious that,
strictly speaking, texts do not seek to achieve anything; “text” here must be
a metonym for the maker of the text—the lawmaker(s). SG seem to be
using terminology similar to what they elsewhere refer to disparagingly as
“the oddly anthropomorphic phrase intent of the document,” which they
say “invites fuzzy-mindedness.”58 But there, they are suggesting that any
reference to “intent” is dangerous, whereas they do not advocate
expunging “purpose” from the vocabulary of interpretation.
They claim that “finding a purpose in text” is normally
“straightforward.”59 “The subject matter of the document” is “its purpose,
broadly speaking;”60 for example, in the case of a statute imposing a tax,
“[t]he purpose is to contribute to the fisc.”61 Actually, this is often
incorrect; tax laws often aim to encourage or discourage particular
activities. But the fact that the purpose of a law may often be obvious does
not diminish the fact that it is really the purpose of the lawmaker. Such a
purpose is a kind of intention. As I have argued elsewhere:

48
Id. at 56. See also id. at 20 (“supposed antonym” textualism does not “preclude[] consideration
of a text’s purpose. . . . [T]he textualist routinely takes purpose into account, but in its concrete
manifestations as deducted from close reading of the text”).
49
Id. at 63.
50
Id.
51
Id. at 40.
52
Id. at 57.
53
Id.
54
Id. at 56; see also id. at 34, 383.
55
Id. at 20; see also id. at 34 (noting that purpose comes only from the text).
56
Id. at 383.
57
Id. at 20; see also id. at 33 (explaining SG’s “Fair Reading” method).
58
Id. at 30; cf. id. at 394 (noting their approval of the term “statutory intent” (emphasis omitted)).
59
Id. at 34.
60
Id. at 56.
61
Id. at 34.
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[S]trictly speaking legal norms—like other inanimate
objects—do not have purposes. A purpose is a kind of
intention: an intention to achieve something. Only intelligent,
reasoning beings can have intentions and purposes. It is true
that we casually say things such as: ‘the purpose of a hammer
is to bang in nails’. But a hammer does not have a purpose of
its own, which is independent of the purposes of human
beings. Its purpose must be the purpose for which it was
either designed, or acquired, in order to be used, or for which
it is in fact used, and that must be a purpose of the person or
people who either designed, acquired or use it. The purpose
of a hammer that has not yet been purchased might differ
from that of a hammer that has been purchased for some
idiosyncratic purpose, such as to form part of a sculpture.
The purpose of a legal norm must, similarly, be the purpose
of either the people who made it, or other people who
subsequently use it, such as (a majority of) the community as
a whole, or perhaps the judiciary, acting on the community’s
behalf.62
It requires further argument to establish that the purpose of the
lawmakers should be preferred to these alternatives, but because all the
possibilities involve collectives, difficulties in explaining collective
intentions provide no reason to prefer any one of them to the others.
Moreover, it is surely apparent that in the situations where SG regard
purpose as obvious, it is made obvious not by the text alone, but by reading
the text in the light of our commonsense understandings of the likely
motivations that led to its composition. That is often how we deduce “the
specific ill that prompted the statute.”63 Such an inference amounts to “an
assumption about the legal drafter’s desires,” which SG condemn as
improper.64 Moreover, if such common sense assumptions can be relied on
as evidence of the lawmaker’s purposes, then perhaps other kinds of
evidence can also be found—including extra-textual evidence.
Perhaps their most explicit acknowledgement that legislatures can have
purposes that may assist interpreters in understanding their Acts is this:
[T]he prologue [to an Act] does set forth the assumed facts
and the purposes that the majority of the enacting legislature .
. . had in mind, and these can shed light on the meaning of
the operative provisions that follow. And this is the view that
62
Jeffrey Goldsworthy, Functions, Purposes and Values in Constitutional Interpretation, in
AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTIONAL VALUES 44–45 (Rosalind Dixon ed., 2018).
63
SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 1, at 219.
64
Id. at 56.
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courts and judges have taken for many years. . . . Justice
Joseph Story wrote that “the preamble of a statute is a key to
open the mind of the makers, as to the mischiefs, which are
to be remedied, and the objects, which are to be
accomplished by the provisions of the statute.”65
Here, the text of the statute expressly declares what the legislature’s
purpose is. That may be consistent with strict textualism, but not with SG’s
denial that legislatures can have any intention other than to enact the text.
Indeed, the text itself explicitly contradicts that denial. SG could stick to
their guns, and argue that even though the legislature cannot really have
any intention or purpose other than to enact the text, if the text
(mistakenly) asserts that the legislature did have some other intention or
purpose, judges should pretend that it did, in order to comply with what
amounts to a textual directive (albeit one based on a falsehood). But they
do not seem to take that approach.
IV. PARTICULAR INTERPRETIVE ISSUES
A. Textual Ambiguities
SG concede that purpose can be crucial to resolving ambiguities and
vagueness.66 For example, “[n]ail in a regulation governing beauty salons
has a different meaning from nail in a municipal building code.”67 One
kind of ambiguity arises when a word or phrase has both an ordinary,
everyday meaning, and a specialized, technical meaning.68 SG discuss
various examples of a statutory word or phrase being found to have a
technical meaning, but do not discuss how we decide between an ordinary
and a technical alternative. Clearly, we resort to contextual evidence of
purpose, but that is surely because it illuminates the drafters’ (and therefore
the legislature’s) probable intended meaning. In accepting that the title and
headings in a statute can help resolve ambiguities, SG say: “[i]n holding
that the statute was indeed a felony statute, the [Mississippi Supreme
Court] rightly stated: ‘If there is any uncertainty in the body of an act, the
title may be resorted to for the purpose of ascertaining legislative intent
and of relieving the ambiguity.’”69
I emphasize the word in italics. Again, this may be consistent with
strict textualism, but not with SG’s denial that legislatures can have any
intention other than to enact the text.
65
Id. at 218 (quoting 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES § 459 at 326 (2d ed. 1851)).
66
SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 1, at 56.
67
Id. at 20.
68
Id. at 69–77.
69
Id. at 222 (emphasis added) (quoting Bellew v. Dedeaux, 126 So.2d 249, 251 (Miss. 1961)).
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B. Scrivener’s errors
SG admit that sometimes, if the literal meaning of the text is absurd,
there must be an “error” that can be easily corrected. 70 What kind of error?
It must apparently be an erroneous choice of words or punctuation marks
by the drafter or scrivener,71 “obviously a technical or ministerial error.”72
But in what sense can a drafter or scrivener use a wrong word? Surely only
if the word chosen does not accurately express what the lawmaker really
meant, or intended, to communicate.
Scrivener’s errors raise two issues, one metaphysical, and the other
epistemic or evidential. The metaphysical issue is: if, due to a scrivener’s
error, the text does not accurately communicate the true law, then what is
the true law? What alternative account is there to an intentionalist one,
which posits that the true law must be the meaning that the lawmaker
obviously intended to communicate? The epistemic or evidential issue is:
on the basis of what evidence can we decide what the lawmaker obviously
intended to communicate? For SG it must be other textual evidence, and
they quote with apparent approval Justice Harlan’s reference to “the law’s
object and design.”73 But as we have seen, intentions and purposes are not
derived unmediated from texts; they are derived by understanding texts in
the light of our common sense understandings of likely human purposes.
This is virtually conceded by SG when they say that the court should
choose “the meaning that causes it [the text] to make sense”—that is,
common sense.74
In discussing one example, SG say that “it is virtually certain that
winning party was meant to be losing party.”75 In other contexts, as well,
they often refer to what a statute was “meant” to say or do.76 This is all
very curious. It immediately raises the question, “meant” by whom? Could
they mean “meant by the legislator(s) who sponsored the statute”? Surely
not: no group of legislators has law-making authority—only the assembly
as a whole has that. So could they mean “meant by the assembly”? Again,
surely not; to “mean” something is surely to have a certain kind of
intention, and they deny that a legislative assembly can have any intention
other than to enact a text.77 The text—warts (including scrivener’s errors)
and all—is the only law that the assembly passed, and on their stated view
the intention to pass it was the only intention that can sensibly be attributed
70
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to the assembly. Moreover, even if an assembly could have such an
intention, they approve of Lord Reid’s dictum that the courts “are seeking
not what Parliament meant but the true meaning of what they said”—“the
meaning of the words which Parliament used.”78
In recounting one instance of such an error being corrected, SG
quote—apparently with approval—the Arkansas Supreme Court’s
conclusion: “No doubt the legislature meant to repeal all laws in conflict
with that act, and, by error of the author or the typist, left out the usual
words ‘in conflict therewith,’ which we will imply by necessary
construction.”79 They also quote, again with apparent approval, the
following words of Justice Story, recommending that in very extreme cases
of absurdity “the plain meaning of a provision . . . [may] be disregarded,
because we believe the framers of that instrument could not intend what
they say. . . .”80 Both quotations are inconsistent with SG’s denial that a
legislature can intend (or mean) anything other than to enact a text, and
their denial that a court should give effect to what the legislature meant
rather than the meaning of the words it enacted.
As usual, they attempt to rely on an “objective” test, one that gives the
text “the meaning that it objectively conveys” rather than “the meaning
that was in the mind of the drafter.”81 They say that their approach involves
“giving . . . [the text] the meaning that it would convey to a reasonable
person, who would understand that misprints had occurred.”82 But that just
postpones the difficulty, without resolving it. On what basis could a
reasonable person conclude that there had been a misprint, other than the
belief that no reasonable lawmaker could have meant (intended) what the
text actually says? Indeed, SG concede that “[t]he absurdity must consist of
a disposition that no reasonable person could intend.”83 But if it were
explained to the reasonable person that this multi-member lawmaker
simply could not have meant (i.e., intended) anything other than to enact
the text, then surely the reasonable person would conclude—as elementary
logic dictates—that there could not be any mismatch between the text and
what this lawmaker intended, or meant. If a legislative assembly cannot
have any intention except to enact the words of the text, then it is hard to
see how a court could be justified in overriding those words on the ground
that no reasonable person could have intended to enact them.
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SG conclude their discussion by stating that “[t]he doctrine of
absurdity is meant to correct obviously unintended dispositions, not to
revise purposeful dispositions that . . . make little if any sense.”84 To which
one can only reply: just so!
C. Presumptions
Many of the canons that SG endorse involve “presumptions,”85 but
what are these presumptions about? A quotation they endorse at the start of
their discussion of one example expresses the long orthodox view:
“[T]here is a natural presumption that identical words used in different
parts of the same act are intended to have the same meaning.”86 The
“presumptions” in general have traditionally been regarded as
presumptions of what the legislature most likely intended.87 SG quote one
of Justice Scalia’s own judgments in which he refers to “generally
applicable, background principles of assumed legislative intent,” against
which, they add, “all laws are enacted.”88
SG treat the presumption of mens rea as such a tacit “background
presumption” (as Justice Rehnquist put it).89 They approvingly quote
Justice Robert Jackson’s statement that “[a]s the states codified the
common law of crimes, . . . their courts . . . recognized that intent was so
inherent in the idea of the offense that it required no statutory
affirmation.”90 They also approve of the Supreme Court’s statement that
“where Congress borrows terms of art in which are accumulated the legal
tradition and meaning of centuries of practice, it presumably knows and
adopts the cluster of ideas that were attached to each borrowed word . . .
and the meaning its use will convey to the judicial mind unless otherwise
instructed.”91 They say that “legislators . . . have reason to assume” that
“consistent judicial practice” will be followed.92 But it should be noted that
this “background assumptions” explanation of mens rea seems to be
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contradicted by their describing it as being “read[] into” statutes—an
example of “the insertion of a requirement that the text does not contain.”93
Many of their canons appear to be based on generalizations concerning
what those who use certain forms of words usually mean (or intend) by
doing so—or what Max Radin called (with SG’s apparent approval)
“ordinary habits of speech.”94 For example, in justifying the presumption
against retroactivity, their first sentence is: “As a general, almost invariable
rule, a legislature makes law for the future, not for the past.”95 Thus
“[s]tatutes . . . typically pronounce what the law becomes when the statutes
take effect.”96 Similarly, the presumption against federal pre-emption “is
based on an assumption of what Congress, in our federal system, would or
should normally desire.”97 Again, “[s]ince the rise of the nation-state,
countries have avoided subjecting people to conflicting laws” by regulating
action within their territorial jurisdictions, and “[i]t has long been assumed
that legislatures enact their laws with this territorial limitation in mind.”98
But the canons are defeasible because these generalizations are not
always applicable. Sometimes it is clear—either by explicit words or “clear
implication”—that the legislature had an unusual intention that contradicts
the relevant presumption, although courts are reluctant to draw that
conclusion.99 As SG observe in relation to one canon, it “must be applied
with judgment and discretion . . . because (as with most canons) the
underlying proposition is not invariably true. Sometimes drafters do repeat
themselves and do include words that add nothing of substance . . . .”100
Later they say that “[t]he imperative of harmony among provisions is more
categorical than most other canons of construction because it is invariably
true that intelligent drafters do not contradict themselves . . . .”101 But even
this harmonious-reading canon is defeasible, if “context and other
considerations (including the application of other canons) make it
impossible to apply . . . .”102 SG often quote—with apparent approval—
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judicial statements to the effect that the legislature is presumed not to
intend something, unless it clearly expresses an intention to do so.103
D. Implications
SG accept “the principle that a text does include not only what is
express but also what is implicit”104—what it “fairly implies.”105 “The full
body of a text contains implications that can alter the literal meaning of
individual words.”106 The skillful and honest judge can distinguish between
filling gaps in the text—which is impermissible—and “determining what
the text implies.”107 They refer to something being “textually implied,”108
and assert “there is such a thing as utterly clear implication.”109
Statutory interpretation is, of course, frequently concerned with
implications. One kind is the so-called “necessary implication”; SG
approvingly quote one writer who said: “A judge may not add words that
are not in the statute, save only by way of necessary implication.”110 Their
leading example is the “predicate-act canon,” which holds that “when a
text authorizes a certain act, it implicitly authorizes whatever is a necessary
predicate of that act.”111 Other kinds of implication they discuss include
repeal by implication, the ejusdem generis canon,112 and the “negative
implication” known as expressio unius est exclusio alterius.113
It is a general truth that, apart from strict logical entailment, what is
implicit in or implied by a text is not determined solely by the meanings of
its words together with rules of grammar. Some additional ingredient is
also required, the most likely candidate being contextual evidence of the
intention or purpose of the text’s author. The challenge for SG is therefore
to explain what is implicit or implied consistently with their denial that
legislatures can have intentions (which entails that they cannot have
purposes either).
In explaining expressio unius, SG employ an everyday analogy:
“When a car dealer promises a low financing rate to ‘purchasers with good
103
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credit,’ it is entirely clear that the rate is not available to purchasers with
spotty credit.”114
This is certainly true, but what is the basis for the clear implication? It
is not solely the linguistic or semantic meaning of the promise. It is the
reasonable inference that by singling out purchasers with good credit, the
car dealer implies that he will not provide the low rate to those with spotty
credit. Philosophers of language explain such inferences in terms of a
general (but defeasible) presumption that speakers and authors attempt to
communicate in a co-operative fashion, by respecting norms of
communication enjoining ‘quality’ (speak truthfully based on evidence),
‘quantity’ (say enough but no more than enough to be informative),
‘relevance’ (speak relevantly to some interest of the hearer) and ‘manner’
(be clear, unambiguous, brief and orderly).115 If the dealer’s promise was
not fully informative as to the availability of the low financing rate, at least
in relation to credit-worthiness—if, in other words, purchasers with spotty
credit were also eligible for that rate—the promise would violate the norm
of quantity and be seriously misleading. That is why the promise is taken
to imply that only purchasers with good credit will be offered a low
financing rate. But this analysis depends on a presumption that the speaker
or author has at least two intentions—to comply with conventional norms
of communication, and therefore to imply something not communicated by
explicit words—in addition to the much thinner intention to enunciate a
particular sequence of words.
SG say (correctly) that whether or not there is such an implication
depends on the particular context. A sign “no dogs allowed,” outside a
restaurant, does not imply that other animals such as pet monkeys are
permitted; the sign deals with the pet most likely to be brought into a
restaurant, and not with unusual, exotic pets. On the other hand, a sign
outside a veterinary clinic stating “Open for treatment of dogs, cats, horses,
and all other farm and domestic animals” would imply that exotic animals,
such as a circus lion, are not treatable there. The more carefully worded
and detailed nature of the sign suggests that the author has made an effort
to be precise. The best explanation for why these contextual details are
relevant is surely that they are evidence of the author’s likely
communicative intentions. SG quote the following from a learned author:
“[I]f Parliament in legislating speaks only of specific things and specific
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situations, it is a legitimate inference that the particulars exhaust the
legislative will.”116
Precisely.
At one point, SG criticize “the slippery reference to intent . . . as
opposed to meaning,”117 yet on the very next page, in discussing the
ejusdem generis canon (which concerns a kind of implication), they say:
The rationale for the ejusdem generis canon is twofold:
When the initial terms all belong to an obvious and readily
identifiable genus, one presumes that the speaker or writer
has that category in mind for the entire passage. . . . And
second, when the tagalong general term is given its broadest
application, it renders the prior enumeration superfluous. If
the testator [in a previous example] really wished [to convey
a different outcome], he could simply have [used the general
term].118
They later add that the canon applies only to general terms that follow
the enumeration of specific and related items, and not to a general term that
follows a single item (as in a bequest of “my car and all other property”).
This is because “[t]here is no reason to conclude, from the single
specification of car, that the testator had only personal property in
mind.”119 This amounts to justifying the canon directly on the basis of the
likely intentions of speakers and authors, evidenced by the “ordinary habits
of speech” noted by Max Radin.120 Moreover, in applying the canon one
must identify the genus constituted by the specific listed items, which they
say is often made clear by “the evident purpose of the provision.”121 Again,
they would say that such a purpose is inferred directly from the text, but
unless the purpose is explicitly stated in the text, it must be inferred from
something in addition to the text, such as our common sense understanding
of the likely purpose of the text’s author.
It is telling that in explaining implications such as that of implied
repeal SG quote, with apparent approval, judges and authors who refer to
intentions. For example, Justice Sutherland stated that an implied repeal is
found “if the later act covers the whole subject of the earlier one and is
116
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clearly intended as a substitute.” That is surely right; it is hard to see
how any Act could cover the whole subject-matter, without purporting to
do so explicitly, other than by manifesting in its policy context the
legislature’s unexpressed intention to do so.123 SG quote Justice Miller who
said in 1875 that “[a] careful comparison of these two sections . . . can
leave no doubt that it was the intention of Congress, by the later statute, to
revise the entire matter.”124
SG also discuss implications in a section dealing with whether statutes
create rights of action. They quote judicial statements to the effect that this
depends partly on whether there is an “indication of legislative intent,
explicit or implicit . . . to create such a remedy,”125 which the Supreme
Court later described as “the central inquiry,” other considerations such as
“the language and focus of the statute, its legislative history, and its
purpose” being “traditionally relied on in determining legislative intent.”126
SG add: “Courts should not look at large for ‘congressional intent’ . . . ;
they should look for the fair import of the statute.”127 The implication must
be “based on the text of the statute—not exclusively on its purpose.”128 The
qualifiers “at large” and “exclusively” are telling; they rule out
investigations into legislative intent or purpose that are unconfined (“at
large”) or ignore the text (“exclusive”), but remain consistent with
legislative intent or purpose being at least relevant, and probably crucial.
E. Conflicting Canons
SG acknowledge that “various canons of interpretation [can] point to
different outcomes, requiring sound judgment as to which have the
strongest force.”129 But what exactly can this “sound judgment” be seeking
if the canons conflict? Surely it must be aimed at which of the canons
appears to provide the weightiest evidence of what the drafters or
lawmakers intended in employing the words they chose. What other
criterion could possibly resolve the conflict? As Richard Ekins and I have
said,
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an attempt to apply the orthodox principles [or canons]
without believing in an independently existing intention is
likely to become an artificial, pointless and debilitating
exercise, like perpetuating religious rituals after abandoning
belief in God. If there is no such intention to serve as the
lodestar guiding application of the principles [or canons],
interpretation is likely to become a kind of game played to
reach desired results. If the fundamental principle of statutory
interpretation [to seek the legislature’s communicative
intention] is set aside, many of the traditional maxims and
presumptions of interpretation will seem like a jumble of
mutually contradictory directives, able to be selectively
marshalled to support whatever interpretation is preferred on
policy grounds. The American legal realist, Karl Llewellyn,
provided the classic account of that predicament.130 On the
other hand, when it is understood that clarification of a
statute’s meaning requires taking into account all admissible
evidence of legislative intention, it can be appreciated that
there may be many items of evidence—some pointing one
way, some another—and that a final judgment requires
weighing them against one another. Sceptics about legislative
intention lack an intelligible criterion or object to determine
how to weigh these items, and can only play the game
depicted by Llewellyn.131
Those who truly believe that lawmakers lack any intention other than
to enact a text must be hard-pressed to propose any plausible means of
resolving conflicts between the interpretive canons in order to avoid
playing Llewellyn’s game.
V. SG’S FALSE DICHOTOMIES
SG reject an exaggerated form of intentionalism, which holds that
“enacted texts merely evoke or suggest—as opposed to state—what the
true law is,” namely, “the legislative intent or will.”132 They insist, to the
contrary, that the statute is the true law, not merely evocative or suggestive
evidence of it.133 This is true, but it relies on a dichotomy that is far too
simplistic to dispose of intentionalism. It overlooks the fact (which they
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acknowledge ) that the meaning of the statute must be more than the
literal meanings of its words; for example, a statute may include
implications, and even what it says may often depend partly on contextual
evidence of the lawmakers’ communicative intentions (as in the case of
textual ambiguities that can be contextually disambiguated). What the text
actually communicates is necessarily determined by contextual as well as
textual evidence of those intentions. That is what sensible intentionalists
mean when they say that both text and context are evidence of the
lawmaker’s communicated intentions, which are what constitutes the
law.135 The law enacted by the statute consists of the norms that the
enactment of the statute’s text, understood in its context, communicates to
the community, which the community understands by inferring from both
text and context what norms the lawmaker intended to communicate.
Confusion may be caused by phrases such as “the meaning of the text”
being ambiguous. Intentionalists are right to assert that the literal meaning
of the text (that is, devoid of context) is not the meaning of the law, but
merely evidence of the law.136 SG are right to assert that the meaning of the
text, understood in its full context, is the meaning of the law.137 But that
amounts to the meaning that the lawmaker appears to have intended to
communicate.
SG also approvingly quote Lord Reid’s dictum that that the courts “are
not seeking what Parliament meant but [rather] the true meaning of what
they said”—“the meaning of the words which Parliament used.”138 Many
other well-known quotations to the same effect are quoted by SG, but
taken at face value these lead interpretive theory into incoherence.139 Such
statements trade on a similarly simplistic and false dichotomy between the
meaning of the enactment and the legislature’s intentions, as if we must
choose either one or the other. For example, SG reject the assumption “that
what we are looking for is the intent of the legislature rather than the
meaning of the statutory text. That puts things backwards.”140 But it is
quite misleading to draw such a dichotomy. The truth—comprehensively
corroborated by SG’s own analyses—is that the meaning of the text
depends on contextual as well as the textual evidence of what the
legislature intended the enactment of the text to communicate.
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SG trade on yet another false dichotomy when they say that
purposivists seek “to give the text not the meaning that it objectively
conveys but the meaning that was in the mind of the drafter.”141 If, as Ekins
and I have advocated, courts continue to confine themselves to publicly
available evidence of “the meaning that was in the mind of the drafter,”
then that can and should be regarded as “the meaning that [the text]
objectively conveys.”142
VI. CANONS UNRELATED TO LEGISLATIVE INTENTION
It is not my thesis that every canon or presumption of statutory
interpretation concerns the clarification of legislative intention. Ekins and I
have acknowledged that some of them may help guide the creative judicial
supplementation or rectification of statutory meaning.143 If so, then SG
may be justified in suggesting that the courts have created some canons to
implement judicial policies rather to clarify inherent meaning.144 If SG
were to persist in denying that legislative intentions exist, except for
intentions to enact texts, then perhaps they should explain all interpretive
canons and presumptions in terms of implementing judicial policies rather
than clarifying inherent meaning. But that would be a very uncomfortable
position for them, because it would amount to approving of the judiciary
having, for centuries, wielded enormous power to shape the contents of
statutes. It would endorse the judges being, in effect, the co-authors of
every statute. That would be contrary to SG’s complaints that historically
“judges who used to be lawgivers took some liberties with the statutes that
began to supplant their handiwork,”145 and that some judges still “refuse to
yield the ancient judicial prerogative of making the law, improvising on the
text to produce what they deem socially desirable results.”146 SG appear to
oppose even the judicial supplementation of statutory meaning when a
provision is intractably ambiguous or otherwise indeterminate; they
suggest that rather than judges making law to resolve the indeterminacy,
they should declare such a provision to be “meaningless and hence
inoperable.”147 SG insist that “good judges dealing with statutes do not
141
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make law. They do not ‘give new content’ to the statute, but merely apply
the content that has been there all along, awaiting application to myriad
factual scenarios.”148 This is inconsistent with all or most of the
interpretive canons being understood as implementing judicial policies.
CONCLUSION
SG’s denial that legislatures can have any intentions other than to enact
particular texts would, if adhered to rigorously, make their version of
textualism unviable. It is inconsistent with context and purpose being used
to (a) dispel ambiguities, (b) correct scrivener’s errors, (c) reveal
presumptions or background assumptions that qualify literal textual
meanings, (d) reveal most kinds of implicit and implied content, and (e)
resolve conflicts between the canons. It would, in other words, entail
hyperliteralism, which SG explicitly reject.149
This is no doubt why, as I have shown, they do not rigorously adhere
to that denial. To the contrary, in accepting that context and purpose can be
used to do all these things, they frequently rely on legislatures having
intentions in addition to merely enacting statutory texts. These include: (a)
intentions that statutory language has particular meanings,150 (b) intentions
that those meanings communicate particular norms,151 and (c) intentions
(called purposes) that those norms should achieve particular objectives.152
Notwithstanding their theoretical dismissal of substantive legislative
intentions as non-existent, SG’s actual interpretive practice confirms the
intentionalist thesis that sensible interpretation of enacted laws necessarily
presupposes the existence of such intentions, and endeavors to reveal and
clarify them.153 Whatever the difficulties of explaining the existence and
nature of collective intentions—a relatively recent research program that
has already made great progress—we seem to have no practicable
alternative other than to keep interpreting enacted laws on the assumption
that such intentions exist.154
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